Posted By David E. Hoffman Share

The terrible sequence of events in Japan — massive earthquake, and then a tsunami — make the nuclear crisis different from Chernobyl in 1986. The Chernobyl accident was not a consequence of a natural disaster, but happened at the hands of people. The design of the reactor was such that it lacked a protective containment; once it exploded, radioactive debris was ejected into the air. So far, at least, the Japan nuclear crisis does not appear to have reached this level of danger.

Still, Chernobyl is worth pondering for another reason. The accident demonstrated the importance of full transparency at moments like this. Chernobyl was a ramrod against the Soviet Union's whole system of obfuscation and secrecy. It reinforced the value of glasnost or openness in the mind of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

When we try to understand the events in Japan, both now and in the months ahead, we ought to ask: have we learned the lessons of Chernobyl?

Chernobyl blew up at 1:23 a.m. on April 26, 1986. In my book The Dead Hand, I recount the events that led to the catastrophe, and its aftermath. The blast blew a hole straight up through the roof of Reactor No. 4, and the explosions were followed by fire. Some debris fell down near the site, but radioactive elements were carried by the winds across Europe. The initial contamination was one nightmare, then came another: the graphite core was on fire and burned for ten days, spewing more dangerous materials into the air.

Hours after the disaster, with the graphite core burning, an “urgent report” arrived at the Central Committee in Moscow from Deputy Energy Minister Alexei Makukhin, who had once been minister of energy in the Ukraine when Chernobyl was first being built. The report said that at 1:21 A.M. on April 26 an explosion occurred in the upper part of the reactor, causing fire damage and destroying part of the roof. “At 3:30, the fire was extinguished.” Personnel at the plant were taking “measures to cool the active zone of the reactor.” No evacuation of the population was necessary, the report said. Almost everything in Makukhin’s report was wrong. The reactor was still burning and was not being cooled, and the population should have been evacuated immediately. What the report did not say was even worse: at the scene, radiation detectors failed, firefighters and others were sent in without adequate protection and officials were debating—but not deciding—about evacuation.


Gorbachev’s initial reaction was slow. He has said he did not have any idea of the scope of what had happened.

But the reason for the lack of information was the Soviet system itself, which reflexively buried the truth. At each level of authority, lies were passed up and down the chain; the population was left in the dark; and scapegoats were found. Gorbachev was at the top of this decrepit system; his biggest failure was that he did not break through the pattern of coverup right away. He reacted slowly, a moment of paralysis for this man of action. He seemed unable to get the truth when he needed it from the disaster scene or the officials responsible for nuclear power.


The Swedes had picked up signs of the radiation, and confronted the Soviet Union at midday on April 28. Up to this point, Moscow had said nothing. At 9 p.m. that evening, the Soviet news media distributed a Kremlin statement so terse as to relay none of the catastrophic nature of the event:

An accident has occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, damaging one of the reactors. Measures are being taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident. The injured are receiving aid. A government commission has been set up.


On the next day, April 29, Gorbachev called another Politburo meeting. There was more discussion about what to say to the outside world. The Politburo decided to issue another public statement, which the historian Dmitri Volkogonov described as “terms that might have been used to announce an ordinary fire at a warehouse.”

The announcement said the accident had destroyed part of the reactor building, the reactor itself, and caused a degree of leakage of radioactive substances. Two people ad died, the statement said, and “at the present time, the radiation situation at the power station and the vicinity has been stabilized.” One section was added for socialist countries saying that Soviet experts had noted radiation spreading in the western, northern and southern directions from Chernobyl. “Levels of contamination are somewhat higher than permitted standards, however not to the extent that calls for special  measures to protect the population.”


While the Chernobyl firefighters and others performed acts of heroism, the bosses of the Soviet state obfuscated. An evacuation of the nearby town of Pripyat was begun only thirty-six hours after the explosion; the second stage of the evacuation, including a wider zone that eventually displaced 116,000 people, did not begin until May 5. The Communist Party in Ukraine insisted that May Day parades should carry on as usual in Kiev even though winds were blowing in that direction.

I found in the Kremlin files an amazing report by a journalist, Vladimir Gubarev, who was science editor of Pravda, the party newspaper.

Gubarev, who had good contacts in the nuclear establishment, heard of the accident soon after it happened and called Alexander Yakovlev, Gorbachev’s close adviser and champion of new thinking. But Yakovlev told him to “forget about it, and stop meddling,” Gubarev recalled. Yakovlev wanted no journalists to witness the scene. But Gubarev was persistent, and kept calling Yakovlev every day. Yakovlev finally authorized a group of journalists to go to Chernobyl, including Gubarev, who had a physics degree but also wrote plays and books. He arrived May 4 and returned May 9. His private report to Yakovlev depicted chaos and confusion. One hour after the explosion, the spread of radiation was clear, he said, but no emergency measures had been prepared. “No one knew what to do.” Soldiers were sent into the danger zone without individual protective gear. They didn’t have any. Nor did helicopter pilots. “In a case like this, common sense is required, not false bravery,” he said. “The whole system of civil defense turned outto be entirely paralyzed. Even functioning dosimeters were not available.” Gubarev said, “the sluggishness of local authorities is striking. There were no clothes, shoes, or underwear for victims. They were waiting for instructions from Moscow.” In Kiev, the lack of information caused panic. People heard reports from abroad but didn’t get a single word of reassurance from the leaders of the republic. The silence created more panic in the following days when it became known that children and families of party bosses were fleeing.


When Gubarev returned to Moscow, he gave Yakovlev his written report. It was passed to Gorbachev.

Gorbachev finally spoke about the disaster on May 14, two and a half weeks after it happened, in a nationally televised address. His speech dodged the reasons for the catastrophe, and advanced the line that people had been alerted “as soon as we received reliable initial information.” Gorbachev seemed to lose his cool entirely at some of the wild accusations that spread in the West while the Kremlin had bottled up information, such as early reports of mass casualties in the thousands. He also took umbrage at criticism of his sincerity as a reformer.

In the weeks after Chernobyl, Gorbachev began to shake off his early inertia. At the Politburo meeting July 3, his fury boiled over at the nuclear establishment. He said:

For 30 years you’ve been telling us that everything was safe. And you expected us to take it as the word of God. This is the root of our problems. Ministries and research centers got out of control, which led to disaster. And, so far, I do not see any signs that you’ve learned your lesson from this . . . Everything was kept secret from the Central Committee. Its apparat didn’t dare to look into this area. Even decisions about where to build nuclear power stations weren’t made by the leadership. Or decisions about which reactor to employ. The system was plagued by servility, bootlicking, window-dressing . . . persecution of critics, boasting, favoritism, and clannish management. Chernobyl happened and nobody was ready—neither civil defense, nor medical departments, not even the minimum necessary number of radiation counters. The fire brigades don’t know what to do! The next day, people were having weddings not far away from the place. Children were playing outside. The warning system is no good! There was a cloud after the explosion. Did anyone monitor its movement?


As I concluded in the book, Gorbachev, in his anger after the disaster, did not turn the spotlight of blame on the Soviet party or the system itself. Rather, he responded by blaming individuals and finding scapegoats, including the plant operators, who were later put on trial. Gorbachev wanted to shake off the lethargy of the system, not challenge its legitimacy. Yet the inescapable truth was that Chernobyl offered a glimpse of how the Soviet Union was rotting from within. The failures, lassitude and misguided designs that led to the disaster were characteristic of much else. “The great glowing crater at Block 4 had revealed deep cracks in the state,” Volkogonov said. He described Chernobyl as a “bell tolling for the system.”

Gorbachev’s emphasis on glasnost, or openness, grew significantly when he finally came to grips with what happened at Chernobyl. At the July 3 Politburo meeting, he declared, “Under no conditions will we hide the truth from the public, either in explaining the causes of the accident nor in dealing with practical issues.” He added, “We cannot be dodging the answers. Keeping things secret would hurt ourselves. Being open is a huge gain for us.”

No matter what happens in Japan, being open about it is a huge gain, still, a quarter century later.

AFP/Getty Images

 

GLEN TOMKINS

3:27 PM ET

March 21, 2011

Crony capitalism and crony socialism

At least so far, the level of release of radioactive material from Fukushima is so much less than at Chenobyl, that the present crisis does not approach Chernobyl in the stress it puts on governmental truth-telling. Fukushima isn't nearly the same level of test of our system of crony capitalism as Chernobyl was of the SU's crony socialism.

But just from what we know already, and can judge as nuclear power lay people, it seems likely that in terms of the design of the reactors, and the particular implementation of that design at Fukushima, crony capitalism has performed at least as badly as crony socialism.

We have been told that the basic concept of the BWRs was so problematic in terms of the ability to withstand a station blackout, that one member of the design team resigned in protest over the approval of the design. The problem is that the container vessel in the BWR makes it difficult to ensure the continued circulation of cooling water around the active fuel rods that is necessary to avoid melt-down. The water must be delivered under pressure, which means that there must be pumps and these must have a source of power that cannot be interrupted, and that the plumbing capable of serving the whole apparatus under the necessary pressures must be maintained wit minimal interruption.

Other engineers must have felt this inherent weakness could be ameliorated, but we don't leave matters of public safety to be settled among engineers. Any succesfully operating regime, one where the human engineering is in place with sufficient robustness to protect the general welfare and safety, will subject competing nuclear engineering claims to scrutiny. The evidence available even at this early stage suggests that the operators of the Fukushima plant were allowed to implement this BWR design without addressing the concerns of nuclear engineers who doubted the possibility of its safe implementation.

A source of back-up power is obviously critical to the ability to withstand the feared station blackout. But the operators at Fukushima were allowed to position these generators at a low elevation, and without a seawall adequate to that elevation, leading to their destruction by the tsunami that accompanied the earthquake. Perhaps there wasn;t enough space at the Fukushima site to accommodate placing the generators at the same elevation as the reactors. But then the operator should have been required to prioritize the placement of the generators at a safe elevation over cramming six reactors onto a site that obviously could not contain all six and still have room for the back-up generators. Alternatively, the operator could have been required to go to the expense of enclosing the generators in an adequate seawall, if that operator were not to be put to the expense of foregoing the sixth reactor. But it seems that the operator was not to be put to any exorbitant expenses.

The theme of space and cramming continues in what we knbow of these containment pools designed to hold spent fuel rods. There is a large pool at ground level at the site, and that doesn't seem to be creating any problems, since these spent rod pools do not require much coolant water turnover, and are not, unlike the reactor vessels, under pressure. But the design of the buildings housing the BWRs includes smaller holding pools for spent rods at a fourth story level of each building. Keeping these sufficiently irrigated has been problematic, because their elevation off of ground level requires both pressure and intact plumbing. The former is endangered in the station blackout scenario, and the latter is endangered by another design feature of these buildings aimed at ameliorating blast damage from problems with the reactors.

We are told these buildings are designed with walls that give way to any internal blast that might arise from hydrogen vented by the BWRs in any failure to irrigate them sufficiently. The walls are designed to give way so that the force of such blasts will be released outward, and not directed towards the reactor containment vessels, thus potentially breaching them. But if give-way walls to the buildings were a design feature required by the presence of the potentially hydrogen-leaking reactors in these buildings, why would the same walls designed to give way in such emergencies also be allowed to support the plumbing needed to irrigate these "hanging garden" spent fuel pools?

Perhaps there are nuclear engineering considerations that make it impossible or at least undesirable to move spent rods to the common, ground-level pool as soon as they are removed from the reactor. But if that is so, you make the operator do something safe to work around that difficulty, rather than letting him take the cheap but unsafe alternative. You make the operator hold the spent fuel in the reactor buildings for as long as they need to be held before they can be moved to the common pool, without putting in the new rods and starting up the reactor again. Or you make them put any pool that has to be in the same building as an operating reactor at ground level, with irrigation plumbing dug into the ground, however expensive it may be to require larger buildings for the reactors. The one thing you don't let the operator do is fire up the reactor with the new rods, thus creating this risk of hydrogen explosions destroying the walls of the building, when he is also allowed to have spent fuel rod pools hanging up in space at the fourth story level dependent on plumbing that snakes up the walls that might have to be sacrificed to make the hydrogen gas explosion not endanger the containment vessels of the active reactor.

Hopefully we have already seen the worst of the nuclear releases that we will see from Fukushima. The Japanese govt will hopefully not be stressed any further in its ability and willingness to be open about the magnitude of such releases.

But this disaster could obvioulsy have been much worse. The damage and lives it has already cost, already clearly exceed the costs that would have been necessary to prevent the disaster. At a minimum, the Fukushima site and all six reactors will have to be written off as total losses, an enormous expense.

The real test of the Japanese govt, and all govts which have allowed the BWR design, is how open they will be about how this design was allowed to be implemented in an unsafe manner in this case. What we know now suggests strongly that TEPCO was systematically allowed to take the cheap alternatives to preventing even outcomes known to be inherent design weaknesses of the BWR. They were allowed to cram too many reactors into a site not adequate to house them and back-up generators. They were allowed to handle spent fuel, whose handling should not have presented nearly the level of danger as the BWRs themselves, in a way that made it perhaps an even greater contributor to this disaster than the BWRs themselves. TEPCO was allowed to make obvious errors to save itself a few bucks, when the consequences of those cost-savings put the general welfare and safety fo the people of Japan and the world to huge costs.

My confidence in nuclear engineering , and the ability of engineers to design safe nuclear power solutions, is not much diminished by this episode. But my faith in the human engineering involved, the willingness of any govt that operates under crony capitalism as does our here in the US to hold "job creators" like TEPCO to even the most obvious safety standards, was low before this episode, and has boiled off since as completely as the water in some fo these "hanging garden" spent fuel pools. No decision-maker who is allowed to privatize the profit and socialize the risk should be allowed anywhere near a design decision for a nuclear power reactor.

 

NIKOS777

12:54 AM ET

April 14, 2011

poor earth!!

poor earth! what we have done to you!! we,the humans are ste most silly kind in this earth! even now we dont learn from older accidents like Chernobyl was,see now what happened!! Still we have nuclear power factorys and we want still more!! Still in Japan all nuclear power factorys are working!! we are silly .. its pity im saying this..thats the truth! we will destroy soon our world! http://rhodesmarket.blogspot.com/

 

David E. Hoffman is a Pulitzer Prize-winning author and a contributing editor to Foreign Policy.

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